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monograph of Paul Groner on SaichO, issued in 1984 (Berkeley). Moreover, 
although the author refers extensively to both Japanese and Western special* 
ized works, there is only a Japanese bibliography. This Japanese bibliography 
merits the reader’s special gratitude because all the titles are translated. On the 
other hand, it is divided, rather inconveniently, into three different lists, which 
contain a few regrettable omissions. A much-needed bibliography of Western 
sources is announced as forthcoming in the next book of the series, on the 
Sakyo ui. So often today, one must protest the lack of references to Western 
sources in Japanese books. Here, we find, in a French book, that same lack­
owing to reasons of space. A novice reader will have much difficulty forming 
an idea of the Western scholarship on the subject. Let us hope also that in the 
next volumes, the text will benefit from a more spacious setting. A more 
generous dispensation of subheadings (even if they have to be put into 
brackets as the translator's insertions) is always welcome. Most of all, for such 
a text, the annotation (850 translation notes, pp. 189-381) should be set as 
footnotes on every page. Then, instead of becoming the bulkiest part of the 
book, a harmonious marriage can be achieved between the subtle translation 
of a compendium which is, by definition, elliptic, and the creative and 
enlightening annotation. It would have made this early and rather neglected 
Japanese Tendai classic even more precious.
Hubert Durt
A STUDY OF DOGEN: His Philosophy and Religion. By Masao Abe, 
edited by Steven Heine. Albany: State University of New York Press, 
pp. 248, ISBN O-79145-O838-8 (pbk.)
A Study of DOgen by Masao Abe is a kind of Eastern Monadology. The 
book is “a collection of essays written over nearly thirty years on various occa­
sions” (author’s introduction p. 12). Each essay is a sort of monad, a 
“worldlet” or little world, that embodies the whole of DOgen’s thought with 
varying perspectives and emphases.
The book is divided into six parts: I. The Oneness of Practice and Attain­
ment: Implications for the Relation between Means and End, II. DOgen on 
Buddha-nature, III. DOgen’s View of Time and Space, IV. The Problem of 
Time in Heidegger and DOgen, V. and VI. The Problem of Death in DOgen 
and Shinran. The first three essays are concerned exclusively with seminal
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aspects of DOgen’s thought; the last three are comparative in nature, one com* 
paring DOgen with Heidegger and two comparing DOgen with Shinran.
I. The “oneness” of practice and attainment, which negates any means­
end, teleological relationship, is not to be grasped as an immediate identity. 
Attainment or the Buddha-nature is the ground or basis for awakening, 
whereas resolution-practice is the condition or occasion for it. This absolutely 
irreversible relation between Buddha-nature or attainment as the fundamental 
ground and resolution-practice as the condition for that attainment is ultimate­
ly reversed due to the nonsubstantiality of attainment and the emptiness of 
Buddha-nature. There is no immediate identity between practice and attain­
ment that exists apart from the mediation of any negation. This provided the 
answer to DOgen’s initial existential koan: if we already possess the Buddha- 
nature, what need is there for practice? In a similar vein one might ask what if 
Mozart had been trained as an investment banker and had never been exposed 
to music at all?
II. The second essay moves from the anthropocentric dimension of human 
beings and the question of birth and death, to the dimension of sentient beings 
and the question of generation and extinction, to the ultimate dimension of 
whole being or all beings and the question of being and nonbeing. True to the 
Middle Way of Buddhist tradition avoiding the two extremes of etemalism 
(sasvata) and nihilism (uccheda), DOgen emphasizes no-Buddha-nature in 
order to clarify the nonsubstantiality of the Buddha-nature and emphasizes 
the bottomlessness or limitlessness of whole being or all beings in order to pre­
vent its or their being objectified. DOgen arrives at no-Buddha-nature which is 
free from the opposition of Buddha-nature and no-Buddha-nature. Both the 
eternalist and nihilist views, toward which we all tend to veer, substantialize 
and are attached to their “objects.” DOgen*s ultimate step is to go from say­
ing Impermanence is the Buddha-nature to being able to say The Buddha- 
nature is impermanence.
III. In this essay Abe tackles the difficult question of DOgen's conception of 
time (and space) which will continue on in the next essay in a comparison with 
Heidegger. Here time is not conceived as a unilinear sequence in which things 
occur, but everything is time or temporality. Time does not just pass away or 
fly by, but is a spontaneous manifestation (genjO) making a passageless 
passage (kyOryaku) to other times while abiding in its own dharma-stage. 
Thus there is no becoming; for example, spring does not become summer, 
firewood does not become ashes. If we do not stand outside of time and 
thereby objectify it, we can live existentially in the present which turns out to 
have two dimensions: a “vertical,” transtemporal dimension that embraces 
past, present and future and a “horizontal” dimension of temporal past, pres­
ent and future moving unidirectionally. How is the transtemporal, vertical
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dimension of time to be experienced? In the practice of zazen we can cut 
through the horizontal dimension of time, complete negate the egocentric self 
by casting off body and mind and realizing the beginninglessness and 
endlessness of time without a bottom. As a bottomless depth this dimension 
cannot be objectified, but can only be existentially realized as no-self, which is 
the true Self.
IV. This essay on the problem of time in the early and the late Heidegger 
and DOgen beings with a discussion of life and death. Life and death 
(samsara) was, of course, absolutely central for DOgen, and Heidegger was 
the first Western thinker to make the problem of death central, unmitigated 
by promises of Platonic immortality of the soul of Christian afterlife. How­
ever, Abe finds that the earlier, and to a lesser extent the later, Heidegger still
smacks of anthro sntrism which is utterly lacking in DOgen.
While in Heidegger the human self (Daseiri) is understood as being- 
unto-death or being-unto-end, and thereby life and death are real­
ized dualistically, in DOgen life and death are completely nondual, 
and the process of living-dying is understood to be without begin­
ning and without end. With the clear, existential realization of the 
beginninglessness and endlessness of human living-dying, the Self 
transcends anthropocentrism and comes to stand on the horizon of 
the entire universe, (p. 126)
This self is neither anthropocentric nor anthropomorphic; it is profoundly 
cosmic.
Whereas the later Heidegger comes to approach a transanthropocentric 
stance, still that stance is incomplete because of the priority of time, which is 
not possible without human existence, over being. For DOgen, all possible 
duality between time (Self) and being is overcome through the realization of 
the nonsubstantiality and emptiness of both being and time. One might say 
that although Heidegger polemicized his whole life against Vorhandenheit (ob­
jective presence) and thus against substantiality, he was never quite able to 
gain a positive experience of nonsubstantiality or emptiness. Nothingness 
remained for him “the veil of being.”
V. and VI. These essays continue probing into the question of death, now in 
a comparison with Shinran’s view. Essay V deals with the differences between 
DOgen’s and Shinran’s conceptions of emancipation, not from death, but 
from birth-and-death itself. In general, Buddhism understands human exis­
tence not as something that must die, but rather as something that undergoes 
the vicissitudes of birth-and-death at each and every moment. For Shinran the 
sinfulness of birth-and-death and the corrupt karma-strickenness of the self 
can only be transformed by the power of the vow through Amida’s merit-
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transference. This is the standpoint of so-called “ other-power.” In contrast, 
DOgen seeks and finds liberation and self-extrication from the limitations of 
being and nothingness, not only from birth and death. This is the most com­
prehensive view possible and represents the standpoint of so-called “self­
Power.”
For Shinran practice and attainment are infinitely separated and opposed. 
Because of our sinfulness there is no way possible for us to gain enlightenment 
through our own efforts and practice. Faith in the power of Amida’s vow 
alone is essential. The result is transformation, not emancipation. There is no 
realization of an original face as it is in the body-mind right here and now. 
Rather than conceiving rebirth in Pure Land literally as being reborn on the 
deathbed in another place, Shinran understands rebirth as the birth of no­
birth in everyday life. The attainment of nirvana necessarily in the future is de­
termined by this present existence. Shinran’s standpoint is thus faith, not 
supreme realization, that of rebirth, not no-birth.
In contrast, DOgen attains the realization of no-birth-and-death directly 
through birth-and-death by releasing birth-and-death. For him practice is 
already practice in realization. Since realization is already within practice, 
realization is endless. Any dualistic conception of practice and realization is 
based on the ego’s calculation of a goal to be reached for its own selfish sake.
Both Shinran and DOgen interpret human existence existentially from 
within, not from some standpoint outside of human existence. Kierkegaard 
would call the latter standpoint from without “fantastic.” There is no duality 
of birth and death, both of which are fundamentally beginningless and 
endless. Neither thinker interprets that which undergoes the vicissitudes of 
birth-and-death as a continuous and therefore substantive being that passes 
“horizontally” from birth to death. The latter is a Western conception most 
rooted in Plato and Christianity, but it remains just that, a conception, an ob­
jectification. The Way or Dharma never exists objectively at all; it simply can­
not be objectified because it is not substantial. It is manifested only upon our 
continuous practice.
Finally, Abe discusses the differences between Shinran’s inverse correspon­
dence of sentient beings to the Dharma and DOgen’s true correspondence. 
Inverse correspondence results in the formed reward body (sambhoga-kaya) 
of the Buddha; true correspondence yields the formless cosmic body (dharma- 
kaya) of the Buddha. One is faith in the promise of realization inherent in 
Amida’s vow; the other is the casting off of body-mind and existential realiza­
tion of the true Person or Buddha-nature.
Obviously these skeletal characterizations cannot do justice to the richness 
and profundity of Abe’s essays. Actually, these characterizations constitute 
more of a sparse overview than review. They are meant to provide a glimpse of
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the cogent philosophical insights proffered in this volume. Abe knows how to 
create clarity and lucidity in what is probably some of the most difficult and 
elusive thought in any philosophical literature, West or East. We can be 
grateful that there is someone who can interpret these extremely difficult and 
important ideas and who also has a sound knowledge of Christianity and 
Western philosophy.
Joan Stambaugh
THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF NISHITANI KEIJI: En­
counter with Emptiness. Edited by Taitetsu Unno. Nanzan Studies in 
Religion and Culture, James W. Heisig, General Editor. Berkeley, CA: 
Asian Humanities Press, 1989, xv + 350 pp. ISBN 0-89581-871-1
THE RELIGIOUS PHILOSOPHY OF TANABE HAJIME: The 
Metanoetic Imperative. Edited by Taitetsu Unno and James W. Heisig. 
Nanzan Studies in Religion and Culture, James W. Heisig, General 
Editor. Berkeley, CA: Asian Humanities Press, 1990, xiii 4- 399 pp. 
ISBN 0-89581-873-8
These two volumes (henceforth abbreviated as RPNK and RPTH), collec­
tions of papers coming out of international symposia on the thought of 
Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990) and Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962) respectively, 
draw attention to the significance of the Kyoto School and its contribution to 
world philosophy. They also further the conversation already going on in 
some circles on the issues raised by and about this religio-philosophical cur­
rent, notably since the publication of English translations of major works of 
the two religious philosophers (Nishitani’s ShakyO to wa nanika, published as 
Religion and Nothingness, trans. Jan Van Bragt, Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982, and Tanabe’s ZangedO toshite no tetsugaku, pub­
lished as Philosophy as Metanoetics, trans. Takeuchi Yoshinori, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1986).
The publication of the above mentioned translations, as well as the prepara­
tion of the symposia (held at Smith College, Massachusetts, in 1984 and 1989) 
and now the publication of the collections of papers based on these, are in 
great part due to the initiative and efforts of the Nanzan Institute of Religion 
and Culture (based at Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan) under the director-
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